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Abstract 
This paper attempts to set the significance of public innovation policies in contemporary 
developing countries in the context of the fast pace of globalization. It is fairly well 
established both in theory and practice that investment expenditure on innovation 
projects is likely to be low if left in the hands of private economic agents as they have a 
tendency to under-invest due to the ‘public good’ nature of the outcomes of R&D. 
However, policy in developing economies seldom takes seriously the importance of 
investment in innovation projects. This has not been without far-reaching implications for 
the growth and development performance of developing countries in general. The paper 
explores the role of international institutions and national governments in the task of 
strengthening national innovation systems through innovative interventions at national 
and international levels. 
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Introduction 
Development is a long-term process and involves both quantitative and qualitative 
changes. In the now-developed countries, this took the form of phased transformation 
from predominantly agrarian to industrial and then knowledge-based economies. Whether 
contemporary developing countries have to go through the same process is a debatable 
question. What is not debatable, however, is the need for policy in these countries to 
address the issue of technological progress underlying the process of transformation. 
Technological progress stems from the build-up of innovative activities; innovation itself 
is the product of a complex set of interactions conditioned by institutional, organizational 
and cultural systems. Restrictive systems limit the scope for innovation and technological 
progress. Dynamic systems, on the other hand, create opportunities for innovation and 
technological progress and hence for long-term growth and development. Why then are 
some countries or societies more inclined to innovation than others? In particular, why is 
the incidence of innovation low in developing countries? 
 
There is nothing in the nature of developing countries that makes them less prone 
to or inherently incapable of innovation. The propensity to innovate is essentially a 
function of factors relating to the roles of the state and the market, and particularly the 
extent to which policy is disposed to take the lead in enabling individual and corporate 
market ‘players’ to seize emerging opportunities through the provision of appropriate 
institutional mechanisms. The nature of these mechanisms varies from country to 
country. In many developing countries, technology policy has taken the form of a ‘top-
down’ linear structure, very much in line with the traditional practice of planning from 
the centre. There is now growing awareness that prospects for innovation and 
technological progress are least enhanced by a top-down approach to technology policy, 
and that the cause for sustainable development would rather be best served through the 
adoption of what has recently come to be known as national innovation systems (NISs) as 
a policy framework. This, however, poses a challenge for policy as it involves a 
multitude of agents of production and consumption engaged in a complex network of 
interactions. For most developing countries, characterized by institutional and 
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organizational fragmentation, the task of setting the NIS in place calls for ‘capacity-
building’ initiatives as a priority policy concern. Not much has been achieved yet in this 
respect, however, so that the potential benefits of technology globalization are likely to 
be unevenly distributed across the spectrum of countries. Thus, the newly industrializing 
countries are, by virtue of their economic status, more favourably placed than the low-
income developing countries to address the issue of innovation through the institution of 
the NIS. 
 
Policy in developing countries is also under the pressure of having to respond to 
the challenges of the global intellectual property rights regime enacted by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and brought forth by the rapid pace of globalization. 
Globalization has not produced a level playing field for ‘players’ in the innovation field 
in both developed and developing countries. Empirical evidence on R&D location shows 
that firms still prefer to establish strategic innovation activities in their home countries, 
despite globalization of investment in innovative activities.1 Cross-border R&D, however 
small, is taking place largely among the advanced countries, while newly industrializing 
countries (NICs) are also seeking to increase their respective shares of global R&D. 
.  
This paper seeks to examine the various instruments and institutional 
arrangements that successful, newly industrializing countries have adopted to encourage 
local technology development and attract cross-border innovation investments. The paper 
is organized in five sections. The second section, following this introduction, analyses 
sources and trends of technology across the world. The third section addresses the 
changing role of national innovation systems in the context of the renewed debate on the 
role of the state under the pressure of globalization. The fourth section maps out the 
technology development experience of the newly industrializing countries and draws 
lessons for developing countries in general. The fifth section analyses the role of public 
innovation policies both in developed and developing countries in the light of the 
changing context forced on international institutions by the globalization trend. 
Concluding remarks are given in the sixth section.  
                                                 
1 Recent estimates for the US economy, for instance, show that nearly 90 per cent of goods and services 
consumed by its residents continue to be produced at home (Eichengreen 2002). 
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Globalization of technology  
In terms of principle, globalization of technology is technology diffusion by another 
name. There are three strands of economic theory that explain long-run economic growth 
and directly address the question how knowledge diffusion takes place. First, although 
neoclassical growth theory seeks to assign a central role to knowledge as a factor 
explaining long-run growth, it considers knowledge as exogenously determined and 
therefore focuses solely on the public good aspect of technology (Solow 1956, 1957). 
Diffusion is assumed to be automatic and costless. However, the prediction and claim of 
the neoclassical theory of growth is that in the long-run, income across economies will 
converge as a result of the free interplay of market forces. Neoclassical theory is 
particularly conspicuous for its reticence regarding the dynamic process of innovation, 
which is far from smooth, automatic and even predictable for its outcomes. 
 
Second, the ‘technology gap’ theory of long-run economic growth emphasizes the 
advantages of technological backwardness and the scope for catching up by the 
developing countries (Fagerberg 1987; Gerschenkron 1962). The mechanism of 
knowledge diffusion in this case involves the mastery of developed-country technologies 
by developing countries. Abramovitz (1979) argued that the existence of domestic 
capability is a precondition to assimilate spillovers from activities originating elsewhere. 
The process of imitation of technology from advanced countries entails cost and this cost 
varies positively with the increase in the complexity of knowledge. Thus, without a 
sufficient level of domestic capabilities, which requires massive investment, a country is 
unlikely to benefit from the technological knowledge conveyed through a variety of 
technology transfer mechanisms. Such a country is consequently doomed to lag behind, 
far from forging ahead and catching up on the technology leaders (Verspagen 1991).  
 
Third, the new growth theory, also known as ‘endogenous growth theory’, 
stresses the role of innovative investment, human capital accumulation and externalities 
as the dominant factors that determine long-run economic growth. The theory 
acknowledges that although it is factor accumulation that accounts for growth, for factor 
accumulation to grow, the returns to capital stock should not diminish. The new 
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knowledge, which prevents diminishing returns on capital stock, is produced by 
investment in research and development. Moreover, the increase in knowledge will not be 
appropriated solely by those who undertake the investment. This implies that the 
investment effort gives rise to appropriable and non-appropriable knowledge categories. 
The latter is alternatively referred to as externalities or knowledge spillovers (Aghion and 
Howitt 1992; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Romer 1986). Central to the new growth 
theory is the role of investment in innovation projects. While latecomers in the 
development process may, in theory, have the advantage of not having to ‘reinvent the 
wheel’, in practice, their access to the spillover benefits is likely to be constrained as 
technological knowledge becomes increasingly complex and tacit in the face of the fast 
pace of globalization (Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002). 
 
The new growth theory invigorated interest in the empirical study of the 
interdependence between economic growth and the international diffusion of technology 
across countries. International trade has been identified as the single most important 
channel for the diffusion of technological knowledge across countries (Coe and Helpman 
1995; Coe et al. 1997; Evenson and Singh 1997). Over time, the composition of trade has 
undergone substantial changes with the weight of science-based high-technology 
products, largely originating from developed countries, constantly increasing. The United 
States accounts for more than one-fifth of the science-based manufactured exports of the 
global economy. Other important countries, which produce and export science-based 
manufactured products, are Japan (10.7 per cent), Germany (8.7 per cent), the United 
Kingdom (7.2 per cent), France (6.2 per cent), the Netherlands (5.6 per cent), Canada (3.2 
per cent), Italy (1.9 per cent), and Sweden and Switzerland (1.4 per cent each). However, 
the developing economies only accounted for 11.7 per cent of the global science-based 
manufactured exports (Table 1).  
 
Multinational corporations predominantly control international trade in the global 
market. Moreover, a substantial proportion of international trade is either inter-industry 
or intra-industry trade (Jones 2001; Kumar and Siddharthan 1997), which means that a 
good part, if not all, of the science-based exports originating from the developing 
economies derives from the operation of multinational corporations operating in these 
 6
economies. This concentration of the source of science-based manufactured commodities 
traded in the global market has reduced the importance of international trade as a true 
carrier of international diffusion of technology.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of sources of technology across countries and regions 
Country/ 
regions 
R&D 
expenditure 
(billion PPP$) 
1997 
R&D 
researchers 
‘000’ 1997 
FDI 
outflows 
(billion $) 
2000 
High-
technology 
exports 
(billion $) 
2000 
Technology 
fees received 
(billion $) 
2000 
Registered 
patents in 
US ‘000’ 
1977–2000 
United States of 
America 
212.8 
(40.8) 
980.5 
(18.9) 
139.9 
(12.1) 
206.3 
(20.7) 
33.8 
(42.2) 
1337 
(57.0) 
Japan 90.1 
(17.3) 
617.4 
(11.9) 
32.9 
(2.9) 
106.5 
(10.7) 
6.9 
(8.6) 
429.4 
(18.0) 
Germany 42.0 
(8.0) 
236 
(4.5) 
48.6 
(4.2) 
87.1 
(8.7) 
11.9 
(14.9) 
173.8 
(7.0) 
France 28.1 
(5.4) 
156 
(3.0) 
172.5 
(15.0) 
62.1 
(6.2) 
2.2 
(2.7) 
68.2 
(3.0) 
United Kingdom 22.6 
(4.3) 
147 
(2.8) 
249.8 
(21.7) 
71.8 
(7.2) 
5.8 
(7.2) 
67.4 
(3.0) 
Italy 12.1 
(2.3) 
76 
(1.5) 
12.1 
(1.1) 
19.1 
(1.9) 
1.6 
(2.0) 
29 
(1.0) 
 
Canada 11.4 
(2.2) 
93 
(1.8) 
44.0 
(3.8) 
31.9 
(3.2) 
 
1.3 
(1.6) 
48.4 
(2.0) 
Netherlands 7.5 
(1.4) 
39 
(0.7) 
73.1 
(6.4) 
56.3 
(5.6) 
6.2 
(7.7) 
22 
(1.0) 
Sweden 7.1 
(1.4) 
37 
(0.7) 
39.5 
(3.4) 
14.1 
(1.4) 
 
0.4 
(0.5) 
22.9 
(1.0) 
Switzerland 4.8 
(0.9) 
23 
(0.4) 
39.6 
(3.4) 
14.2 
(1.4) 
2.8 
(3.5) 
31 
(1.0) 
Developed 
Countries 
438.5 
(84.0) 
3713.3 
(71.6) 
851.3 
(86.6) 
881 
(88.3) 
72.9 
(91.0) 
 
2229.1 
(94.3) 
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Developing 
Countries 
83.5 
(16.0) 
1476.2 
(28.4) 
298.6 
(13.4) 
117 
(11.7) 
7.2 
(9.0) 
135.8 
(5.7) 
TOTAL 522 
(100.0) 
5189.4 
(100.0) 
1149.9 
(100.0) 
998 
(100.0) 
80.1 
(100.0) 
2364.9 
(100.0) 
 
Notes: 1.Figures in parentheses are percentages. 2. PPP stands for purchasing power parity. 
Source: UNESCO (2001); World Bank (2003); Kumar (2003) 
 
On the other hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) has gained significance from 
the point of view of its capacity to transmit technological knowledge and novel 
management techniques. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are considered as leaders in 
producing innovations of commercial significance, including new technologies, new 
products and new organizational forms. This makes MNCs a potent vehicle of 
international technology diffusion (Carr, Markusen and Maskus 2001). Empirical studies 
conducted to examine the impact of foreign investment on international technology 
diffusion, however, report mixed results. Aitken and Harrison (1999) show a negative 
relationship between FDI and total factor productivity of the domestic plants. However, 
Xu (2000) found a positive relationship between productivity growth and FDI in an 
aggregative study covering 40 countries. The impact of foreign direct investment on 
productivity is stronger and more robust for advanced countries than it is for less 
developed ones. The dismantling of control systems by the developing countries through 
liberalization policies to attract FDI has not, however, helped much in promoting 
innovation efforts. The mere presence of FDI does not, of course, significantly change the 
situation of technological knowledge and the gains to be derived from it until developing 
countries step up efforts to absorb, adapt, master and improve technology. Indeed, in the 
absence of innovative capabilities in most of the developing economies, the gains arising 
from FDI initiatives has remained concentrated in the developed countries. 
 
Trans-border scientific and technological cooperation has become an increasingly 
important channel for international transfer of technological knowledge. There has been a 
substantial increase in the number of strategic technological partnerships among 
governments and firms. During the period 1980–2000, technological alliances have 
 9
increased from 212 to 574 (NSF 2002). However, studies which have examined the 
incidence of strategic alliances during the period 1987–94 show that more than 93 per 
cent of the recorded strategic technology partnering involved countries based in the 
developed world (Narula and Sadowski 2002). 
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Table 2 
Distribution of research and development expenditure financed from abroad 1993–98 
. 
Country/Year Percentage of the 
total 
1993 
Percentage of the 
total 
1998 
Percentage point 
change 
1993–98 
Canada 10.1 13.6 +3.5 
Denmark 7.3 6.4* -0.9 
Germany 1.6 2.4 +0.8 
Finland 1.8 5.1 +3.3 
France 8.1 7.9* -0.2 
Italy 4.4 5.0 +0.6 
Japan 0.1 0.3 +0.2 
Netherlands 5.3 12.8* +7.5 
New Zealand 2.4 5.2* +2.8 
Norway 5.4 6.5* +1.1 
Sweden 2.9 3.4* +0.5 
Switzerland - 3.1* - 
United Kingdom 11.9 16.8 +4.9 
United States - - - 
European Union 5.9 7.0* +1.1 
Source: OECD (2000) 
Note: * implies figure belongs to the year 1997 
 
Both output and input indicators of innovation, presented in Table 1, clearly show 
a high degree of concentration of innovative activities in developed countries. The United 
States, Japan, Germany and France together accounted for 71.5 per cent of the global 
R&D expenditure. The high share of developed countries in total R&D expenditure (84 
per cent) and in the global population of scientists and engineers (77.6 per cent) reflects 
their control on the global trend of innovation and technological progress.  
 
The high degree of concentration in the share of developed countries has, however, 
diminished to some extent during the last decade of the twentieth century (Savvides and 
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Zachariadis 2003). There are two fundamental reasons for the decrease in the 
concentration in R&D expenditure. First, the newly industrializing countries in South 
East Asia have stepped up substantially their innovative effort and emerged as important 
players in the development of new technologies. Second, there is a growing trend of 
internationalization of R&D expenditure through the growth in the activities of 
multinational corporations. The growing trend of internationalization of R&D in the 
1990s can be seen from Table 2.  
 
A larger proportion of the commercially-oriented R&D expenditure in the 
advanced countries is undertaken by the multinational corporations of the respective 
countries. The growing trend of internationalization of innovative activities of the 
advanced countries is spearheaded by a small number of the multinational corporations. 
The overseas R&D expenditure of US corporations increased from 6.4 per cent in 1982 to 
11.72 per cent in 1994. The overseas R&D expenditure of Japanese multinational 
corporations increased from 1.44 per cent in 1989–90 to 2.3 per cent in 1996–97 (Kumar 
2002). Wide differentials have been noticed in the location of R&D expenditure of 
multinational corporations of different developed countries. A larger proportion of the 
outward location of innovative activities is due to multinational corporations originating 
from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. More than 90 per cent of the total 
overseas R&D expenditure incurred by US multinational corporations is located in the 
advanced industrialized countries. The meagre amount of overseas R&D, which goes to 
less-developed countries, basically focuses on adapting products to the needs of local 
users (Evenson and Westphal 1995; Archibugi and Pietrobelli 2002). Thus, despite 
globalization, distribution in the generation of knowledge has been concentrated in 
regions/hubs where competencies agglomerate (Cantwell and Iammarino 2002; Kumar 
2002; Guerrieri et al. 2001). A handful of multinational corporations owning and 
controlling commercially-oriented innovative activities draw on the domestic innovative 
activities, but market their products globally.  
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National innovation systems (NISs) and the role of the state 
Knowledge accumulation is very much rooted in the evolution of human civilization. 
Governments have pursued science and technology policies to improve the innovative 
performances of agents of production (Mowery 1995). They have also created a network 
of institutions to promote interactions between agents of production and enhance their 
competitiveness in the international market. The accumulation of knowledge and 
provision of the infrastructure to enhance the generation of knowledge and the 
implementation of technology policy have been brought together in the formulation of the 
concept of national innovation systems (NISs). The NIS is a new approach for the study 
of innovation (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1988, 1992; McKelvey 1991; Nelson 1993). 
Innovations are viewed in the NISs approach as part of a larger process of development 
of knowledge of economic relevance and also as an important determinant of economic 
growth. Due to the complexity of the innovation processes, economic agents of 
production do not innovate in isolation, but through interactions with other organizations 
to gain, develop and exchange knowledge, information and other resources.  
 
There are three important factors which influence the innovation behaviour of 
economic agents of production: the infrastructure and skill base which determines the 
development of science and technological outcomes; the interactions between firms and 
between firms and other organizations which have learning effects; and the role 
governments play in support of advances in science and technology. Historically, the 
state has played a fundamental role in the evolution of the NISs and thus, in the pace and 
direction of technological progress. After World War II, the federal government of the 
United States stepped up its research and development expenditure which peaked at 
around 67 per cent of total R&D expenditure in the mid-1960s. The federal government’s 
R&D expenditure remained much higher than private R&D expenditure until 1980. 
Thereafter, the share of federal R&D expenditure started declining, dropping to 49.8 per 
cent in 1989 (Goodacre and Tonks 1995; Mowery and Rosenberg 1993). By the last 
decade of the twentieth century, the share of the federal R&D expenditure had declined to 
33 per cent of the total R&D expenditure in the United States (Ruttan 2001). Even so, it 
is worth noting that the competitive edge of the US industries has mainly resulted from 
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the strategic support extended by the federal government. In the words of Ruttan (2001: 
602):  
 
Government has played an important role in technology development in almost 
every US industry that has become competitive on a global scale. The government 
has supported agricultural technology through research, the automobile industry 
through design and construction of the highway infrastructure, the development of 
the computer through military procurement, and the growth of the biotechnology 
industries through support for basic biological research. 
 
Contrary to the US experience, public R&D expenditure incurred by the Japanese 
government remained quite low at 19.9 per cent of the total R&D expenditure in the year 
1988 (Goodacre and Tonks 1995), and declined substantially during the 1990s. However, 
state intervention through the MITI remained all-pervasive in terms of providing 
leadership and setting goals for innovative activities in the private sector. Among the 
developed European countries also, state intervention was active in terms of providing 
innovative resources during the last half of the twentieth century. During this period, 
national innovation systems progressed and matured to a level that would enhance the 
competitiveness of agents of production in both domestic and international markets. In 
countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, R&D expenditure by the 
public sector dwindled during the last decade of the twentieth century (UNESCO 2001).  
 
Table 3 
Share of business R&D expenditure in GDP across countries 
Name of 
country 
 1971 1981 1991 1998 
Belgium 0.71 0.96 1.16 1.28 
Canada 0.38 0.49 0.59 1.01 
Denmark 0.41 0.46 0.85 1.34 
Finland 0.44 0.62 1.07 2.07 
France 0.67 0.79 0.99 1.34 
Germany (West) 1.13 1.40 1.57 1.40 
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Ireland 0.30 0.26 0.58 0.98 
Italy 0.44 0.43 0.61 0.74 
Japan 1.09 1.38 2.13 2.37 
Netherlands 1.02 0.83 0.91 1.08 
Norway 0.41 0.50 0.77 0.95 
Portugal 0.09 0.10 0.14 N/A 
Spain 0.11 0.18 0.38 0.41 
Sweden 0.80 1.24 1.71 2.65 
Switzerland 1.67 1.68 2.07 N/A 
United States 0.81 0.91 0.94 1.78 
United Kingdom 0.97 1.17 1.36 1.13 
Mean 0.67 0.79 1.05 1.37 
Standard 
deviation   
0.42 0.47 0.56 0.61 
Source: OECD (2000); Patel and Pavitt (2000) 
 
Significantly, business-funded R&D expenditure has emerged as the most 
important and widely accepted indicator of innovation in recent years. Table 3 shows the 
increasing importance of the business-funded innovative activities. Countries vary in 
terms of experience with respect to private sector expenditure on R&D; but in most 
countries, business-funded R&D has received substantial government support through 
incentives and tax concessions (Ruttan 2001). The nature of state intervention has, 
however, undergone a substantial transformation from direct participation to indirect 
participation via supporting commercially-oriented research through public–private 
participation and also through the provision of subsidies and tax incentives. 
 
The experience of East Asia and lessons for less-developed countries 
East Asian economies sustained high rates of economic growth and transformation since 
the 1970s. Technological progress and international trade are the two fundamental factors 
behind this structural transformation. The share of science-based (high-tech) exports in 
the total manufactured exports of East Asia and Pacific countries was on average 30 per 
cent in 2000. This compares favourably with the corresponding figure for high-income 
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countries, which was 23 per cent for the same year. However, not all East Asian countries 
have performed equally in terms of high-tech exports, as can be seen from Table 4. 
Notice, for example, the difference between Singapore (with 63 per cent of total 
manufacturing exports based on high-tech exports) and Indonesia (where high-tech 
exports account for only 16 per cent of the total manufactured exports).  
 
East Asian countries also differ from one another in terms of the sources of 
technological progress, as can be seen from Table 4. Taiwan is, for example, ranked 
second in the global economy just next to the United States, according to the international 
technology index. The Republic of Korea ranked ninth in 2001 and slipped to eighteenth 
position in 2002. Singapore and Malaysia are the two other East Asian countries that rank 
high in terms of technological achievement according to the international technology 
index. On the other hand, Thailand and Indonesia rank low.  
 
 
Table 4 
Indicators of technology across East Asian countries 
Country 
 
 
Share 
of R&D 
expend. 
in GNP 
(%) 
High-tech 
exports as % of 
manufactured 
exports (2000) 
 
Patents 
registered 
in the US 
(2000) 
Quality of 
secondary 
education 
ranking 
(1998) 
maths  
Quality of 
secondary 
education 
ranking 
(1998) 
science 
Patent 
protection 
index (1990) 
  
 
Technology 
index rank 
(2002) 
 
Indonesia 0.07 
(2000) 
16 - 34  32 2.4 
(72) 
65 
Korea, Rep. 
of 
2.68 
(2000) 
35 3472 
(7) 
2  5 4.5 
(29) 
18 
Malaysia 0.42 
(2000) 
59 47 16  22 4.4 
(33) 
26 
Taiwan 2.08 
(2000) 
39 5806 
(3) 
3  1 4.6 
(27) 
2 
Singapore 1.47 
(1997) 
63 242 1  2 5.7 
(12) 
17 
 16
Thailand 0.16 
(2001) 
32 30 27  24 4.0 
(38) 
41 
Source: UNESCO (2001); Yusuf (2003), World Economic Forum (2003); World Bank (2003) 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses in the column two are the years for which the latest data is available.  
2. Figures in parentheses in column four are global ranks. 
3. Ranks of mathematics and science are based on a test conducted for problem solving abilities of the 
students in 38 countries. 
 
There are two distinctly discernible patterns of technological development, which 
can be observed from a careful analysis of the national innovation systems of the East 
Asian countries. First, the technological achievements in terms of high-tech exports and 
sustained high rates of economic growth have been dependent on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The countries which followed this path of technological development 
are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, as is apparent from both 
the input and output indicators of technological performance shown in Table 4, industrial 
enterprises in these countries have weak technological and competitive capability. This is 
because the national innovation systems in these countries have remained weak in the 
face of foreign capital that continued to play a dominant role in the supply of technology. 
 
The second pattern emerging from the experience of East Asian countries  relates 
to the  path of technological development based on the national innovation system with 
little or no reliance on foreign direct investment, as in the case of Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea). Both these countries used the opportunity of import-
substitution and export-promotion strategies and domestic innovative investment efforts 
to build technological capability at an enterprise level. These countries moved 
successfully on the technological ladder through an interactive approach to learning. 
First, they created high-quality educational institutions to train the manpower required for 
new opportunities in the industrial sector. In particular, they put strong emphasis on 
science- and engineering-based higher educational institutions. This provided the 
creative, imitative and adaptive learning capabilities for the reverse engineering of 
products and processes developed by the advanced industrialized countries. Governments 
in both Taiwan and South Korea created a web of science- and technology-based 
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institutions that helped them understand the complex process of technological 
innovations. They also took the lead in facilitating access to required technologies and in 
providing the incentives that private enterprises would need to underwrite the risk of 
innovation (Suh 2000; Kim 2000).  
 
Thus, the proactive role of the state in terms of exposing enterprises to the 
competitive global environment helped to transform enterprises from being imitators to  
being innovators in a short span of time. In addition, the governments in Taiwan and 
Korea used a weak intellectual property rights regime to allow enterprises to absorb the 
technological knowledge derived from the developed countries, using reverse engineering 
ators of technological knowledge. Protection of intellectual property rights remained 
quite weak despite legislation aimed at appeasing the international community, 
particularly the US government (Kumar 2003; Wade 1990).  
 
Success in technological experience which saw Taiwan and Korea evolve from 
being imitators to being innovators has important implications for other developing 
countries that are keen to draw lessons from the experience. First, the active role the 
government took in terms of the provision of supportive institutional arrangements as 
well as funding for R&D and skill development was crucial for stimulating and 
reinforcing the innovation effort of enterprises. Second, governments have the 
responsibility to enact and enforce the accountability of enterprises and public institutions 
engaged in innovative activities. Third, foreign direct investment does not fill the gap of 
technological knowledge unless and until a minimum level of technological knowledge is 
acquired by the domestic enterprises (Siddharthan 2004). Finally, intellectual property 
rights (IPR) are now a major constraint on innovation because of their enforcement by the 
WTO. This would make it difficult for less-developed countries to copy the experience of 
East Asian countries that thrived on the prevalence of weak IPR regimes. However, less-
developed countries have the option to negotiate longer time frames for the 
implementation of IPR. They can also negotiate for compensation from the loss incurred 
due to strong IPR regimes and use this fund for initiating a strong innovative base within 
the country to enhance their competitive advantage. 
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What should governments in developing countries do?  
Internationalization of economies is taking place under the rules of the game enacted by 
international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). These institutions are striving to restructure the role of the state and 
have been successful in providing a dominant space to international capital as well as to 
market forces. Reduction of fiscal deficit and the universal applicability of a strict IPR 
regime weaken the boundaries of national innovation systems and diminish the 
effectiveness of the effort of governments to support and promote innovation-related 
activities. The globally applicable strict IPR regime has been devised by the WTO 
keeping in view the rise in the commercially-oriented innovative activities in the 
advanced countries, on the one hand, and the rise in imitative/reverse engineering 
activities in the newly industrializing countries, on the other.2 But is there reason to 
believe that the WTO is essentially driven by the commercial interest of enterprises in the 
developed countries? At the heart of this question is the conflict between the innovative 
and ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour of enterprises. What is not clear, though, is the boundary 
beyond which IPR ceases to serve as an appropriate reward to the risk borne by 
innovators and becomes a factor that constrains innovation.  
 
For reasons of externalities associated with innovation, there is divergence 
between the social and private returns from investment in innovative activities, the 
former being higher than the latter. This is the principal reason for the reluctance of 
private sector agents to engage in innovative activities (Arrow 1962; Stiglitz 1999; Mani 
1999). A consensus has not yet emerged, however, on the reduction of spillover gaps 
from a uniform framework for IPR and the achievement of equitable gains to both 
developed and developing economies. The economic theory of public goods and 
historical evidence regarding development of the innovative capabilities of nations, 
however, clearly provide enough support for the state to enable domestic agents of 
production to innovate with the view to enhancing their long-term competitive advantage. 
 
                                                 
2 For US enterprises alone, the loss of profits due to free technology copying is estimated to range between 
$60 billion and $2.3 billion per annum (US International Trade Commission 1988). The magnitude of the 
loss becomes smaller, however, when refinements are introduced to the analysis (Maskus and Konan 1991).  
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The IPR regime enforced by the WTO is based on the official public policy stance 
taken during the discussions and negotiations of R&D subsidies contained in the original 
Dunkel draft of the GATT subsidies code. The original Dunkel draft provided for 
government contribution not to exceed 50 per cent for basic research or 25 per cent for 
applied research. This was revised raising government support from 50 per cent to 75 per 
cent (Gibbons 1994). The UK government introduced tax credits for R&D towards the 
late 1990s. This initiative shows the growing awareness about the importance of public 
innovation policies. Most developing countries, on the other hand, continued to adopt 
patent laws to protect intellectual property rights, but dramatically reduced public R&D 
expenditure as well as public support to institutions on the lines suggested by the WTO.  
 
The crisis that afflicted the East Asian economies in 1997 led to the renewal of 
the role of the state in terms of provision of good governance, including, inter alia, 
support to innovation efforts. It also helped the international community to rethink as to 
how the market and the state can be made to work together. According to the World Bank 
(1999), a major role of the government in developing countries is to develop capabilities 
for creating knowledge at home and to provide support to domestic agents of production 
to take advantage of the large global stock of knowledge. The UNDP has taken the lead 
in identifying knowledge gaps between developed and developing countries and 
articulating arguments against the strict IPR regime enacted and implemented by the 
WTO. The UNDP has also identified knowledge as a global public good and the role of 
international community in reducing the knowledge gap (UNDP 2001; Stiglitz 1999). 
Thus, a major role of the state in developing countries is to provide a policy framework 
that will enable domestic agents of production to capture the spillover benefits created by 
the globalization of capital and technology. 
 
Conclusion  
This paper has explored the significance of innovation policies in developing countries 
for strengthening the national innovation systems and enabling domestic agents of 
production to achieve technological development and competitiveness in the global 
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market. Developing countries, however, seem to ignore the importance of national 
innovation systems, preferring instead to adhere to the intellectual property rights regime 
put in place by the WTO. There are two possible reasons for this. First, developing 
countries appear to perceive, if naïvely, that because technological globalization has 
become pervasive, domestic agents of production will have no problem in drawing on the 
global pool of knowledge. The focus is thus on liberalization policies, the global 
knowledge market and its accessibility to developing countries. But this position assumed 
by developing countries smacks of the naïve neoclassical view that innovation is an 
automatic and costless process. Nothing, however, can be further from the truth. 
Moreover, the WTO’s strict IPR regime is generally criticized for being disposed in 
favour of the interests of enterprises in developed countries and against innovation and 
capability development initiatives in developing countries.  
 
The second reason for the apparent neglect of the active role of the state in 
promoting national innovation systems relates to the budgetary implications of structural 
adjustment policy. The pursuit of stringent control over fiscal deficit has the effect of 
reducing the capacity of governments in developing countries to allocate resources for the 
strengthening of national innovation systems. The fast pace of globalization has thus 
made intervention by the state rather difficult. It has not, however, diminished the 
importance of state intervention; rather it has heightened the case for capability 
development so that developing countries could maximize the benefits to be derived from 
the spillover effects of the global technology market. The articulated response of the state 
in the newly industrialized economies such as Taiwan and South Korea to the challenges 
of technology globalization by strengthening the national innovation systems provides a 
lesson of experience for other developing countries, where globalization is considered to 
be more of a threat than an opportunity. 
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